The 'rules' of the General Elections in
Malta are defined by the Constitution and other subsidiary
legistlation.
This page contains an explanation of how Malta votes.
How Malta Votes: An Overview
This brief account will describe the unusual system
which Malta uses for its elections and then give a summary
of the outcome of Maltese elections over the years.
A. THE SINGLE-TRANSFERABLE-VOTE SYSTEM
There are only two countries in the world, Malta and
Ireland, which elect their national legislatures by way
of a method called the single transferable vote (STV).
This method was invented in the 19th century, was ardently
advocated by John Stuart Mill, and continues to intrigue
political scientists the world over. Many political reformers
still regard it as one of the fairest ways to translate
the wishes of voters into parliamentary seats for candidates
and parties. The manner in which STV is conducted involves
some rather complex procedures. Still, the essentials
of the method can be described in fairly simple terms.
Under STV, all voters are asked to give a preference
ranking to as many candidates on the ballot as they wish,
in numerical order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, etc.. When
indicating their preferences voters may choose candidates
from different political parties although in actual practice
Maltese voters rarely stray from the candidates of their
chosen party.
In order to win a seat, a candidate must receive a specified
"quota" of votes in the district. This quota
is, broadly speaking, determined by taking the number
of valid votes and dividing them by the number of seats
plus one. For instance, if in a particular district 5
candidates are to be elected and 12,000 votes have been
cast altogether, then the quota would be 12,000 divided
by 6 (i.e. 5+1) or 2,000 votes. [To be precise, the formula
actually is (votes/(seats +1)+1).]
When the ballots are first counted, the first (number
1) preferences on all ballots are examined, and any candidate
who received enough first preference votes to meet the
quota will be declared elected. It often happens that
some candidates have more first preference votes than
the quota actually required for election. In that case,
all votes which a candidate received in excess of the
needed quota are declared surplus votes. But these votes
are not disregarded; instead they are transferred to the
candidate who was indicated on the ballot as the voter's
next-ranked choice. Once these votes have been transferred,
a second count will be made to determine whether any other
candidate has now achieved the quota.
Additional counts will usually be necessary to determine
the various winners in succession. If on any count no
candidate meets the quota, the candidate with the fewest
number of votes is eliminated and his or her votes are
transferred to the candidate who is the next-ranked choice
on the ballot paper. (If a ballot paper no longer indicates
a preference for a remaining candidate, then the vote
becomes 'non-transferable' and remains unused.) These
transfers of votes, from candidates who have either been
elected or eliminated, continue through successive counts
until all seats have been filled.
This method of election differs significantly from the
first-past-the-post, winner-take-all system used in Great
Britain and the U.S., and from the party-list proportional
representation system used in many West European countries.
The most important features of the single transferable
vote method are that (1) several candidates will be elected
in each district; (2) voters cast their votes for individual
candidates in preferential order, not for a list of party
candidates; and (3) voters are free to distribute their
preferences among candidates of different parties or independent
candidates. These features recommend themselves to many
electoral reformers, especially those who are concerned
about the adequate representation of various minorities
among the electorate.
B. THE VOTERS' CHOICES
How have Maltese voters acted under the STV system and
with what results? Here are five noteworthy aspects of
Malta's electoral system in action.
1. Over the years, Malta has moved from
a multi-party to a two-party system. In the 1950s and
1960s a number of smaller parties secured a substantial
number of votes and some seats in the legislature. These
smaller parties included the Constitutionalists, the Gozo
Party, the Maltese Workers Party, the Democratic Action
Party and the Christian Workers Party. None of them lasted
for more than a few years. Since 1971 the two major parties
-- the Nationalists (PN) and the Labour Party (MLP) --
have dominated the electoral arena with no serious competition
from any other party. The most recent third-party challenge
has came from the Alternattiva Demokratika; in 1992 it
polled only 1.7% of the vote and it fared even worse in
the succeeding two elections.
2. Political competition in Malta is
marked by a high degree of partisanship. Divisions among
the political parties are sharply drawn; political discussion
is often heated; and there have even been a few instances
of political violence in recent years. Intense partisanship
goes hand in hand with a high voter turnout at elections.
Maltese voters have the highest turnout figures of all
Western democracies. Also, they show their partisan commitment
at election time by the remaining impressively loyal to
their political party. Even though the electoral system
permits it, voters hardly ever split heir voting preferences
among candidates of different parties (in 1992, a mere
1.2% of the Labour votes and 2.0% of the Nationalist votes
were transferred to candidates of another party).
3. While political competition is vigorous
and boisterous, none of the Maltese parties preach revolutionary
change. They differ on many issues (privatization, the
European Union, taxation and the like) but they are agreed
on the fundamentals of the constitutional order and democratic
processes. Unlike some other European countries, Malta
has not had to contend with anti-regime parties that threatened
the political system itself. The Communist Party made
one attempt to participate in elections in 1987; it polled
119 votes (0.05%).
4. The electoral support for Maltese
political parties is not only sharply divided along partisan
lines; it is also distributed fairly equally among the
two major parties. All elections since 1971 have been
close contests between the two major parties, with the
result that parliamentary majorities for the parties have
been wafer-thin. There have been no landslide victories
and the voter "mandate" which winning parties
usually claim has tended to be remarkably weak over the
years. The 51.8% of the vote which the PN received in
1992 was exceptionally high for a party. In order to seize
the reins of government, the PN needed only 42.0% of the
popular vote in 1962 and 47.9% in 1966. (The popular vote
a4h–Cegislative seat percentages for each election are
provided at the end of this article.)
5. When the parties are fairly evenly
matched in voter support, then the process of translating
votes into seats can produce unexpected and distorting
outcomes, as was demonstrated in a spectacular fashion
by the "perverse" result of the 1981 election.
In that year the MLP gained 49.1% of the popular vote
yet obtained 52.3% of the seats in parliament and formed
the government. While some disproportionality between
vote and seat percentages has been quite common, what
made the situation unprecedented was that the rival party
(the PN) had actually obtained a majority of the popular
vote but was not rewarded with a majority of the legislative
seats. The same situation occurred again in 1987 and once
more in 1996, but by then a newly adopted constitutional
amendment provided that the party with a majority of the
popular vote would be awarded a sufficient number of additional
seats to give it a legislative majority.
The outcome of the 1981 election highlighted a common
problem with electoral systems, that of systematic disproportionality
between vote percentages and seat percentages of political
parties. Sometimes, such disproportionality is engineered
through dubious practices like "gerrymanders."
Often it results from built-in factors such as small election
districts. Malta has constituencies with five members,
each seat therefore being 20% of a district's total. However,
since votes never distribute themselves into neat 20%
segments, there will always be some disproportion between
vote and seat percentages at the district level. Usually
these disproportionalities tend to cancel each other out
on a national basis; but there is no assurance that this
will happen in every election.
Ever since the adoption of STV in Malta in 1921 there
have been recurrent expressions of discontent and proposals
for change. These were usually prompted by a party's disappointment
with the outcome of a previous election or concern about
its electoral prospects. In the wake of the 1981 election
result have come the most far-reaching and sustained attempts
at electoral reform. These proposals, vigorously promoted
by the then Nationalist government, proclaimed the dual
aim of assuring both proportionality and "governability"
(the latter meaning one-party control of government).
The proposed adoption of the d'Hondt method on a national
basis would have promoted proportionality. But it failed
to garner the needed bipartisan support in parliament.
Instead, constitutional amendments adopted in 1987 and
1996 seek to assure "governability" by providing
one-party legislative majorities as much as possible,
even at the expense of proportionality.
Source: www.maltadata.com